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Properties are Potatoes?: An essay on 
ontological parsimony 
NIKK EFFINGHAM 
29th July 2014 
 
The cost/benefit analysis is standard fare in contemporary ontology: we measure how a theory 
performs along a variety of dimensions (simplicity, coherence with intuitions etc.) and then – 
having completed this for all theories currently being evaluated – we opt for the theory that has, 
overall, the best cost-benefit profile. §1 is a more detailed exposition of this methodology. One of 
those theoretical dimensions is ontological parsimony, and one common way of achieving it is 
‘reduction by identification’ whereby an initial theory that commits to the Xs and the Ys has a 
more parsimonious rival according to which each X is one of the Ys (e.g. properties are identical 
to classes, possible worlds identical to disconnected spacetimes, material objects identical to 
spacetime regions etc.). This chapter argues that a theory achieving such ontological parsimony 
by this method is never a point in its favour – with the exception that it might, in general, push us 
towards a one-category ontology. This may be because you give up on ontological parsimony as a 
virtue or the tenability of making reductions by identification. Alternatively it may be because you 
agree that it’s a virtue and the reductions are tenable, but that the only thing you can draw from 
this is that we should endorse a one-category ontology. This chapter argues for the latter, 
although the other options – ditching either reduction by identification or parsimony as a virtue – 
are both lessons you may draw instead. As the former conclusion permits ontological parsimony 
achieved via reduction by identification to play some role in ontology (since it forces us towards a 
one-category ontology) and these options rule out even that role, they are stronger than the 
paper’s intended conclusion – but in that all options rule out ontological parsimony playing 
anything other than a very diminished role in theory choice, I’d be happy for you to accept any of 
them.  
I begin by laying out an absurd theory involving arbitrary identifications, ‘Spudism’: that every 
property is a (different) randomly selected potato (§2). §§3-6 defend Spudism, showing how the 
tools already deployed to make other, less absurd, identifications plausible can likewise be used to 
make Spudism plausible. The lesson generalises: if we accept any reductions by identification, 
nothing should stop us making absurd and arbitrary identifications between whatever things we 
like. I conclude that if parsimony is so easily achieved it effectively becomes a useless tool for 
deciding between competing ontological theories (§7).  
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1. The Standard Methodology 
1.1 Strands of Simplicity 
A standard understanding of how to practice ontology is to evaluate the available theories along 
a variety of dimensions and then, having weighed up the costs versus the benefits, settle on the 
best theory overall [cf Lewis 1973: 88]. Various dimensions have been mooted e.g. the degree that 
a theory coheres with our intuitions, adherence to the scientific enterprise, and simplicity. The 
latter, which people broadly agree counts as a virtue, breaks into different strands. We’ll consider 
three (each sub-dividing into ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ variants):  
 Ideological: A primitive is any n-adic predicate that admits of no analysis within the theory. A 
theory is quantitatively more ideologically parsimonious than another theory if it has fewer 
primitives than it (so if one theory takes as primitive set membership and mereological 
parthood, this is less parsimonious than a theory which only takes mereological parthood as 
primitive). A theory is qualitatively parsimonious if it has fewer kinds of primitive e.g. a 
theory might take as primitive atemporal mereological parthood (that two-place relation 
that holds between, say, regions of spacetime) and temporally relativised parthood (that 
three-place relation that holds between, say, a car, its wheel, and a time) which is two 
primitives but the same kind of primitive. (Cowling [2013] discusses this in more depth.) 
Note that quantifiers, operators, connectives etc. should also probably be weighed when it 
comes to ideological complexity, but this paper needs no discussion of such complications 
so this caricature of ideological simplicity will suffice. 
 Veritalogical: Brute truths (or brute facts) are those truths that aren’t explained by any other 
truth in the theory. Theories will (almost certainly) feature brute truths e.g. the fact that 
some objects are exactly located at some spacetime regions, or some properties are 
coexemplified at a certain spacetime region, or some given principle of composition is true 
etc. Quantitative veritalogical simplicity consists in minimising the number of brute truths; 
qualitative in minimising the kinds. For instance, if there are brute facts about which 
regions of spacetime are filled with matter then in a continuous spacetime there’ll be an 
infinite number of brute truths, but still only truths of one given kind.  
 Ontological: It is better for a theory to have fewer things in it. Considered qualitatively, we 
demand fewer ontological categories e.g. a theory committing only to spacetime regions is 
more parsimonious – is simpler than – a theory committing to properties, sets, and 
spacetime regions (as the former has one category, whilst the latter has three). Below I will 
explain, in more detail, what this amounts to. Considered quantitatively, we simply want 
fewer things in the theory e.g. a theory committing to n particles is more parsimonious than 
a theory committing to m particles when m > n. (Many believe ontological parsimony is a 
virtue; notable deployment of parsimony include Lewis [1973: 87], Nolan [1997], and 
Tallant [2013]).  
It’s not clear that everyone cares for these dimensions (e.g. Huemer [2009] or Sober [1981]). It’s 
not clear how to weigh them against one another (e.g. do we think qualitative ontological 
parsimony is more important than quantitative? What costs to ideological parsimony should we 
shoulder if it avoids such and such costs concerning ontological parsimony? Do we care one jot 
about quantitative veritaological parsimony? etc.). It’s not clear, when it comes to the qualitative 
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strains of the above, what counts as a different kind (are a unicorn and a person the same kind of 
thing or are they both material objects? Are ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ ontological categories or 
are categories more finely grained than this? Etc.). It’s not clear if the above are the only demands 
– for instance, is there an exotericness requirement such that ‘normal’ entities/primitives/truths 
are less costly than ‘weird’ entities/primitives/truths (e.g. we might think set membership [Lewis 
1991: 29-35] or instantiation [Armstrong 1978: 66; Heil 2003: 131] is a mysterious relation, and 
that this mysteriousness counts against the theory). Lots of things are unclear about the standard 
methodology.  
1.2 Reduction by Identification 
But even in the face of such a murky methodology, some things have wide agreement. One 
thing that is widely (though not universally) agreed is that we can achieve ontological parsimony 
(qualitative or quantitative) by deploying ‘reduction by identification’. This involves taking entities 
from one category and identifying them with entities from another category to produce a theory 
more parsimonious than one where those entities are distinct. Examples of such ontological 
reductions by identification include:  
 Material Objects: Supersubstantivalists identify objects with the regions of spacetime they are 
exactly located at (Sider [2001: 110] explicitly thinks ontological parsimony favours 
supersubstantivalist ontologies). Alternatively we might identify objects with bundles of 
properties, rather than having an ontology of properties and distinct objects.  
 Properties: Rather than having an ontology of irreducible properties we might identify them 
with, e.g., classes of their instances [Lewis 1986a: 50-69; Quine 1940: 120].  
 Possible worlds: Worlds have been identified with universals [Forrest 1986], states of affairs 
[Plantinga 1974], sets of propositions [Stalnaker 1976], and spatiotemporal regions [Lewis 
1973; 1986a].  
 Propositions: Propositions have been reduced to sets of possible worlds [Lewis 1986a] and 
facts [King 2013]. 
 Numbers: Numbers have been identified with sets. 
 Classes: It has been proposed that classes are properties (or tropes, or entities constructed 
out of such things) [Bigelow 1990; 1993; Caplan, Tillman, and Reeder 2010; Forrest 2002; 
Johnston 2006; Jubien 1989; see also Lewis 1991: 56n13]. They have also been identified 
with states of affairs [Armstrong 1997, 2004]. 
 Events: We might reduce events (like the Boer War) to properties of regions of spacetime 
[Lewis 1986b] and achieve parsimony that way. 
 Works of music: We might identify works of music with types [Dodd 2007] or with fusions of 
their performances [Caplan and Matheson 2006].  
 Organisations: We might identify organisations and groups (such as Barclays Bank Plc, 
football clubs, or the Supreme Court) with fusions of their members or, alternatively, sets 
of their members. (Elsewhere I both provide a roster of the former [2010: 254] and argue 
for the latter).  
In each case it looks as if the identification achieves ontological parsimony. Say a category is 
‘ontologically relevant’ if it picks out those categories that are relevant to ontological inquiry. Use 
THIS FONT for the names of categories. CHICKEN BORN IN THE USA is a category, but not an 
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ontologically relevant one, whereas ABSTRACT SET, POSSIBLE WORLD, NUMBER, MATERIAL 
OBJECT etc. are the sorts of categories that are likely to be ontologically relevant. Exactly what 
categories are ontologically relevant is irrelevant to this paper. In the examples that follow I’ll 
treat categories like ABSTRACT SET, POSSIBLE WORLD, NUMBER, MATERIAL OBJECT etc. as 
ontologically relevant – if you instead think other categories are relevant, e.g. PARTICULAR and 
UNIVERSAL, tailor the discussion and examples accordingly. If we start with a theory that has two 
ontologically relevant categories, Cx and Cy, with entities x1, x2… xn in Cx and y1, y2… ym in Cy, 
where the xs are distinct from the ys, we can get a more parsimonious theory by identifying each 
y with one of the xs. Regarding quantitative parsimony: we go from having n+m entities to having 
n entities and (as m > 0 ) we have achieved fewer entities in our ontology.1 Qualitative parsimony 
is more complicated. Qualitative parsimony isn’t just a case of having fewer ontologically relevant 
categories as a reduction by identification will leave you with the same categories. For instance, if 
you carry out Lewis’s reductions of worlds to disconnected spacetimes you still have worlds and 
spacetimes – so either ways, you commit to the categories POSSIBLE WORLD and SPACETIME 
REGION. What we need is the least number of ‘basal categories’ (you might say instead 
‘fundamental categories’ or some such, but I want to divorce talk of fundamentality and 
grounding from qualitative ontological parsimony, so use the more neutral term ‘basal’). A 
(rough) definition would be: if all entities from an ontologically relevant category are (in every 
metaphysically possible world) a member of a different ontologically relevant category, then the 
former has been reduced to the latter and is non-basal e.g. if POSSIBLE WORLD and SPACETIME 
REGION are ontologically relevant categories but every world is a disconnected spacetime then we 
have reduced worlds to regions and POSSIBLE WORLD is not basal (and SPACETIME REGION will 
be basal just as long as it is not itself also reduced).2 Returning to the generic example, identifying 
the ys from Cy with xs from Cx therefore makes for a qualitatively parsimonious theory. 
Reduction by identification is just one way we might achieve ontological parsimony. Two other 
ways are extant. We might achieve parsimony via elimination. A theory that commits to, e.g., 
properties and objects is less parsimonious than a nominalist theory which eliminates all 
properties, leaving us with simply the objects. Or we might buy into ‘reduction by grounding’ 
whereby there are grounding relations (or relations of ontological dependence or some such) and 
all entities that are grounded are not to be considered when it comes to concerns of parsimony 
(see, inter alia, Baron [Forthcoming] and Schaffer [2009: 361]). For example, a theory that 
commits to fundamental properties and objects would be less parsimonious than one that has 
objects grounded in bundles of properties. In general, we will ignore these alternatives as this 
paper only concerns the tenability of reduction by identification.3   
                                                        
1 Complications arise if we consider ontologies with an infinite number of entities e.g. comparing an ontology 
with an infinite number of statues and an infinite number of distinct lumps of clay to an (intuitively more 
parsimonious) ontology consisting of just an infinite number of statues, each of which is identical to one of an 
infinite number of lumps of clay. Let us set aside this complication as tangential to the overall argumentative line 
of this chapter. 
2 This is only a rough and ready definition. For instance, if there are only two categories and every member of Cx 
is a member of Cy and vice versa, what I’ve just said makes both basal but we might want but one to be basal. As 
with any analysis, we could extend and refine it further – but it will be guide enough for what comes in the sequel. 
3 I’m not suspicious of parsimony by elimination. I am suspicious of reduction by grounding. The idea that 
grounded entities are ‘nothing over and above’ the entities they are grounded in seems as unmotivated as claiming 
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2. Spudism 
Consider the following, absurd, reduction: every property is a potato. Red is the potato I ate last 
night; blue is the one you ate the night before; charge is a potato from the 18th century that has long 
ago rotted away; pain is the first potato that Sir Francis Drake ever ate etc. Call this theory 
‘Spudism’. Spudism may be absurd, and might face insuperable problems, but be clear that it is 
nonetheless more parsimonious than a theory where, e.g., properties are sui generis universals. 
Where that latter theory has the basal categories MATERIAL OBJECT and PROPERTY, Spudism 
would only have MATERIAL OBJECT as basal, for every property is now a material object. Where 
we once had some objects, x1… xm, and some distinct properties, y1… yn, giving us m+n things, 
each y is now one of the xs and there are only n things; n < m+n so the theory is quantitatively 
parsimonious. Spudism may be implausible – and it may be wrong – but it is comparatively 
parsimonious to the theory where properties are sui generis and, if we could only cast our ceteris 
paribus clause widely enough, we would prefer Spudism to that theory for, ceteris paribus, we should 
prefer more parsimonious theories to more profligate rivals. 
‘But things are not equal!’ everyone shall cry. If they are not equal Spudism must come with 
some cost that weighs against it. We can’t just stare incredulously at Spudism (for no incredulous 
stare is itself a cost [cf Lewis 1986a: 133-35]) so any incredulity about Spudism must find its 
source in a reasoned complaint that will show Spudism has a theoretical cost that outweighs its 
parsimonious benefits. Two reasons seem like obvious candidates for being what might drive us 
away from Spudism:  
 Spudism is absurd because potatoes and properties have different properties, and so (from 
Leibniz’s Law) cannot be identical. §3 deals with this. 
 Spudism is arbitrary. I’ve plucked from thin air the identification with potatoes (why not 
with carrots? Or atoms of Betelgeuse? Or non-repeating rational numbers ending in a ‘4’? 
Or false propositions?) and also because the individual identifications of which potato each 
property gets identified with is also arbitrary. §5 deals with this worry. 
I think these two motivations are the main reasons one would think Spudism was absurd. 
However, we’ll canvass other objections – objections I suspect one would have thought we never 
needed to rely upon given the prima facie absurdity of Spudism. They are that: 
 Spudism isn’t ideologically parsimonious, and so fails to guarantee the sorts of benefits we 
want from an ontological reduction. §4 deals with this 
 There aren’t enough potatoes given the number of properties there are, which would mean 
two distinct properties would end up being erroneously identified with the same spud. §6 
deals with this objection. 
                                                                                                                                                       
that an entity that supervenes on another entity is nothing over and above the entities it supervenes on 
(Armstrong [1991: 192; 1997: 12] claims such a principle is true; Daly [2012], Melia [2005], and Schulte [2014] all 
fail to see the motivation for it). Why believe it? Certainly not everyone does [Audi 2012]! We might say it has 
something to do with the fundamental entities ‘explaining’ the grounded entities, but then this is less about the 
theoretical dimension of ontological parsimony and everything to do with explanatory power (and, in not being 
about parsimony, is undeserving of the phrase ‘nothing over and above’!).  
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3. Property Problems 
The first problem for Spudism is that there appear to be properties that potatoes have (or don’t 
have) which properties don’t have (or have). Similarly for them standing in different relations. 
Consider:  
 Azure is beautiful, but Spudism may identify it with a potato that is quite unlovely. 
 Potatoes are concrete whilst properties are abstract. 
 They stand in different intentional relations. I might have a favourite property, but not a 
favourite potato.  
 Spin-up was discovered by two scientists in the 1920s, but they presumably didn’t 
simultaneously discover a potato (‘Why, I say Gerlach, as we conducted our experiment I 
found this never seen before potato under the table!’). 
 Potatoes aren’t the relata of ‘purely metaphysical’ relations e.g. charge is instantiated by 
electrons, but no electron instantiates a potato.  
 They have different modal properties. If the evolution of the planet had gone slightly 
differently potatoes would never have existed, but spin-up and charge would nonetheless still 
have existed. 
 They have different persistence profiles. Whatever potato I identify with spin-up won’t last 
forever, but spin-up will always be there. 
The objection will be that as potatoes do (or do not) have the example property, whilst 
properties don’t (or do) then no property can be a potato. The generic form of the objection is 
that the potato is F, the property Spudism identifies with the potato is ~F and so Spudism entails 
a contradiction. For each instance of this generic argument form, there are two ways to avoid it: 
the revisionary strategy and the conciliatory strategy. In both cases the strategies have already 
been developed and deployed in the case of non-absurd reductions by identification – all 
Spudism needs to do is tweak these extant strategies to meet its own ends.  
3.1 Revisionary Strategy 
We might revise our belief that the potato/property is (or isn’t) F. Spudists should say that 
potatoes are instantiated by some things, that properties are concrete, and that I do like that potato 
identical to my favourite property.  This revisionary strategy has already been deployed in 
previously mooted ontological reductions. Consider: no work of music occurs; the region of 
spacetime to my left doesn’t pay taxes nor love me; Barclays Bank Plc doesn’t exert a 
gravitational force; that the world could have been such that no clowns exist doesn’t have a size 
measured in light years. Each is false given the example reductions by identification covered in 
§1.2: if we believe works of music are fusions of events, then works of music will occur; given 
supersubstantivalism, some regions pay taxes and love me; if organisations are fusions of their 
members, Barclays Bank Plc is a gerrymandered object with a mass; if possible worlds are 
Lewisian then most ways the world could be have a size (except those where, e.g., only 
disembodied minds exist). Those who engage in ontological reductions in general should 
therefore not pause to think that, e.g., potatoes are instantiated. Or consider the example 
concerning the abstract/concrete status of properties and potatoes. It’s not unreasonable to 
revise what we think is abstract and what we think is concrete. Perhaps this is because we think 
the divide is a shoddy one [Wilson 2011]; perhaps because things can be both abstract and 
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concrete [Turner 2010: 30n55]; perhaps because one doubts that our intuitions about what things 
are abstract and concrete are as solid as we’d like them to be (for instance Black [1971: 617] and 
Williams [1953: 10] both think we could be mistaken when we think sets are abstract – we can 
easily imagine that readiness to accept that revision about the metaphysical status of sets 
translating to a readiness to accept it about properties or, indeed, any other entity). Finally, in the 
same way that Lois Lane might think she doesn’t love Clark Kent but reality conspires otherwise, 
reality might conspire to make it the case that, just as I am very fond of charge, I am very fond of 
some potato.  
So if we already accept that reduction by identification is plausible (which we must charitably 
grant since denying it makes for a stronger conclusion than even this chapter argues for) you 
should accept that we can use the revisionary strategy. And if you accept that we can use the 
revisionary strategy you should accept that some of Spudism’s property problems go away.  
3.2 Conciliatory Strategy 
But not all of them go away. To see why, examine why the revisionary strategy might have 
footholds on the alleged problem cases. The problematic sentences avoided by the revisionary 
strategy consist of a predicate (‘__ pays taxes’, ‘__has a mass’ etc.) and a subject (a region, 
Barclays Bank Plc etc.) such that the predicate is never, in normal everyday life, applied to the 
subject. I dare say only a philosopher has ever wondered whether space pays taxes or what the 
gravitational attractive force of Barclays Bank is! Intuitions about such weird scenarios aren’t 
compelling, so it’s easy to see why revisions are acceptable (indeed, in a sense nothing is being 
‘revised’ per se as you’ve never considered the belief that gets the allegedly counterintuitive 
change).  
But problem cases remain that aren’t like this i.e. are such that the predicate is used in normal, 
everyday life in a way that rallies against the suggested ontological reduction. Imagine there are 
three potatoes: two King Edwards (a and b) and one Austrian Crescent (c), so a and b resemble 
one another more than they do c (i.e. a, b, and c are, in order, the relata of the (three place) 
predicate ‘__ resembles __ more than it does __’). But, given Spudism, the first King Edward is, 
e.g., the property crimson, the second King Edward the property cyan, and the Austrian Crescent 
potato is the property scarlet. As crimson is more similar to scarlet than it is cyan, a and c are more 
similar to one another than they are to b. But it can’t both be true that a is more similar to b than 
it is to c and that a is more similar to c than it is to b! A second problem along similar lines: spin-up 
wasn’t discovered until the 1920s, but if I identify it with a potato that grew in a cave and was 
never found then it was never discovered.  
In both cases the relevant predicates (‘__ resembles __ more than it does __’ or ‘__ was 
discovered by __ in the year __’) are predicated of their subjects (colours, physical properties) 
frequently outside the philosophy room in a way that we do not predicate ‘__ pays taxes’ of 
spatiotemporal regions. It seems wrong, then, to use the revisionary strategy and revise our 
beliefs about the resemblance of potatoes or the resemblance of colours (or a property/potato 
having been discovered or not). A possible way out would be to stipulate that the potatoes and 
properties match-up in just such a way that the predications always align. Whilst that might make 
sense with colour resemblance (such that crimson and scarlet are always identified with King 
Edward potatoes that resemble one another more than the Austrian Crescent that is identified 
Page | 8 
 
with cyan) it clearly won’t work with the discovery of spin-up as it’s false that Gerlach and Stern – 
the discovering physicists in question – simultaneously found a potato at the same time they 
made their discovery. I won’t, then, pursue this bankrupt line of argument. 
We must instead pursue a new, conciliatory, strategy: it’s acceptable (somehow, someway) for 
sentences of the form ‘a is F’ and ‘a is ~F’ to both be true. We’ll set aside dialetheism for two 
alternative solutions – both of which are, again, already used by those who use reductions by 
identification.  
The Context Shift Solution 
The first solution is that the apparently contradictory predications are made in different 
contexts. Resemblance makes for a good case study. Imagine a gallery has on display a giant 8ft 
tall papier-mâché model of the pen knife that Abraham Lincoln had in his pocket the night he 
was assassinated. In one context – such as the context that the artist or the commissioner of the 
piece might find themselves in – it’s true to say that the artwork resembles the knife. But imagine 
that during the opening night of the exhibition, during which both the model and the original 
knife are on display, a bomb is discovered. Taking the original knife, I set to defusing the bomb. 
Halfway through the process I realise the need for another knife – or knife-like object – to 
complete defusing the device. Where I then to point at Lincoln’s pen knife and say ‘I need 
something that resembles this’ I would be gravely disappointed if you waddled over carrying the 
8ft tall papier-mâché knife! In the bomb defusing context the model does not resemble the pen 
knife. Hence the three-place resemblance predicate ‘__ resembles __ more than __’ is context 
dependent. So we could treat the resemblance of properties/potatoes as context dependent, such 
that when we use certain subject terms to refer to the entities (‘Crimson’, ‘Scarlet’, ‘Cyan’) a 
sentence featuring the predicate is to be evaluated one way whereas when the subject terms are 
different (‘Potato a’, ‘Potato c’, ‘Potato b’) the sentence is evaluated differently even though the 
subject terms refer to the same entities (as Crimson = a, Scarlet  = c, and Cyan = b). In such cases 
we say the predicate is ‘Abelardian’ [Noonan 1991, 1993]. Conciliation has been achieved.  
Abelardian predicates can also help with reconciling apparently conflicting modal predications if 
we embrace counterpart theory (which is unsurprising given that the counterpart relation is a 
resemblance relation). Those who believe constitution is identity – who, e.g., identify statues with 
the lumps of clay that constitute them – make use of just this feature. The counterpart theorist 
has it that the statue cannot survive being crushed but the lump can (even though the two are 
numerically identical). In a context where we are considering the object before us as a statue 
(where we use, e.g., the subject term ‘Goliath’ to refer to it) we are concerned with what ‘statue-
counterparts’ it has at other worlds – of which there are none which are a squashed lump of clay. 
When we are in a context whereby we consider the object as a lump (and, e.g., refer to it as 
‘Lumpl’) we are concerned instead with what ‘lump-counterparts’ it has at other worlds – of 
which there are many which are squashed lumps of clay. Thus it is that in one context the object 
before us can survive being squashed, whilst in another it cannot.  Similarly, then, we might say 
the same of the potatoes/properties. Considered as a property, the King Edward that is spin-up 
has counterparts at many worlds (and all worlds if properties exist necessarily, whether 
instantiated or not), whether that counterpart is another potato, the set of all things that spin up, 
or a Platonic universal. Considered as a potato, however, the King Edward has counterparts at 
quite different worlds i.e. only those at which tokens of the type solanum tuberosum appear.  
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Nor are Abelardian predicates the only way for context shifts to solve the problem. Consider 
existential claims being read restrictedly or unrestrictedly e.g. mereological universalists accepting 
that we can truly deny the existence of trout-turkeys because, unbeknownst to us, when we say 
nothing has both a trout and a turkey as a part we are restricting our quantifier to exclude 
gerrymandered objects like trout-turkeys (in just the same way that the ‘All’ in ‘All the beer is in 
the fridge’ can vary its domain dependent upon context) [Goodman 1966: 51; Jubien 1993: 4-5; 
Lewis 1986a: 213]. Or consider the eternalist who says most people are correct to say dinosaurs 
don’t exist because, usually without noticing, we restrict our quantifiers to those things that exist 
at the present moment. And it works the other way around whereby we unknowingly unrestrict 
rather than restrict: one might say abstracta now exist, even though no abstracta exactly occupy 
any sub-region of the hyperplane that is the present moment, because (rather than restricting our 
existential claim to what things occupy the hyperplane) we unrestrict to quantify over everything, 
which includes the unlocated abstracta. So it is with Spudism. When I stand next to the decayed 
mulch that was once the King Edward identified with spin-up, I can truly say that spin-up exists, for 
in that context I quantify unrestrictedly. I can also truly say that the potato does not exist for, in 
that context, I quantify restrictedly so that the relevant domain only includes those entities that 
exactly occupy some portion of the hyperplane that is the present moment – and that doesn’t 
include the potato.  
The Analogical Predication Solution 
Context shift is one solution; an alternative is to deploy ‘analogical predication’. To get a grip on 
it we’ll use the example of works of music.4 Take the (true) sentence ‘Red Red Meat’s song 
Stained and Lit lasts five minutes’. Problematically, no matter what realist theory we accept, no 
work of music appears to last five minutes – at least, not in the same way that, e.g., a song can 
last five minutes. Consider: if works of music are abstract sui generis entities, then – in being 
outside space and time – Stained and Lit doesn’t ‘last’ any length of time; if they’re fusions of 
scores then as the scores of the song have been in existence for longer than five minutes, the 
song would last too long; if works are fusions of performances then Stained and Lit starts at some 
point in the early 21st century and will last as long as mankind has a copy of it and plays it 
(maybe, then, tens of thousands of years); and so on and so forth. Whatever we identify works 
with, Stained and Lit doubtlessly won’t last five minutes. What the realist needs are two predicates: 
one, the literal non-analogical predicate, applies to the performance; the other, non-literal, 
predicate – which is an analogue of the former – applies to the work of music [Dodd 2007: 46; 
Wolsterstoff 1980]. So Stained and Lit doesn’t literally last five minutes (for only its performances 
do that) but it does analogically last five minutes.  
We can use analogical predication in Spudism’s case: take Azure and the predicates ‘__ is 
aesthetically pleasing’ and ‘__ is unlovely’. Assume that the nobbled potato I identify Azure with 
is quite unlovely – it is literally unlovely. This is consistent with it being aesthetically pleasing, as 
long as we read that predication as being analogical: Azure is (analogically) aesthetically pleasing 
and not (analogically) unlovely, whilst it is (literally) unlovely and not (literally) aesthetically 
pleasing (as it’s an ugly looking potato). Again, this sort of move is going to be made by anyone 
who engages in reduction by identification for if we were, say, a class nominalist then, as classes 
                                                        
4 Indeed, it’s from that literature that I take the term ‘analogical predication’. 
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exist outside space and time, they have no aesthetic features at all – not in the same way that a 
breath-taking landscape or a painting by Caravaggio has aesthetic features. Indeed, even a realist 
who takes properties to be sui generis will likely have to say the same (at least if they locate the sui 
generis properties outside spacetime). So, as its competitors have to accept some such machinery, 
Spudism doesn’t come off worse for wear if it likewise uses the same sort of moves to resolve its 
own property problems. This isn’t to say analogous predication doesn’t have problems (see, for 
instance, Kleinschmidt and Ross [2013]) but only that it’s as well off as the theories it competes 
against which accept the existence of properties. 
3.3 Extending the sketch 
The above is just a sketch of how to tackle property problems but it should be easy to see how 
to extend it to other examples. Note, also, that there’s no reason not to swap the strategies 
around (even amongst the examples already given). The predicate ‘__ resembles __ more than it 
does __’ need not receive the context-shift treatment, for we could just as easily give it the 
analogical predicate treatment i.e. potatoes literally resemble one another and different pluralities 
of potatoes analogically resemble one another. Or we might be revisionary, instead of 
conciliatory, about modal profiles and hold that all things necessarily exist (à la Williamson 
[1998]) so that potatoes do necessarily exist. So bear in mind that the above is just a sample of 
how we might approach the different problems that arise. 
One specific extension worthy of note is to use the strategies with regards to ontological 
dependence as ontological dependence also prima facie poses a property problem. Potatoes 
ontologically depend on their atoms and don’t depend on, e.g., azure coloured cars, but we tend 
to think that either properties depend on their instances or vice versa – either ways, the humble 
potato identified with Azure will either partially depend on an azure coloured car (which isn’t 
right!) or the car will partially depend on the potato (and that’s not right either!). There’s no 
reason why the above strategies can’t be deployed to help with ontological dependence. We could 
revise our beliefs about what things depend on what other things (which, if we take seriously 
enterprises like Schaffer’s priority monism [2010], is something we might already  find appealing 
for priority monism engages in just such revision). Alternatively we could pursue conciliatory 
avenues. Perhaps ontological dependence talk is (like causal dependence is oft thought to be) 
context-dependent. Or maybe there are literal and analogical senses in which one thing might 
depend on another. I’ve never seen such ideas extended to the relation of ontological 
dependence, but it would be interesting to see them worked out in full.  
4. The Ideology Difficulty 
Another problem for Spudism – another possible cost outweighing its parsimonious benefits –
is that it provides no ideological simplicity, whereas we tend to find successful reductions by 
identification do just that. Consider, e.g.: 
 If worlds are certain regions (say, disconnected spacetimes), such that anything which is 
possible takes place at such a  region, we can allegedly analyse modal primitives in terms of 
what goes on at those regions [Lewis 1986a: 5-20].  
 If propositions are sets of possible worlds such that < P > is the set of worlds at which P is 
the case, we can, e.g., analyse ‘< P > is actually true’ as ‘The actual world is a member of < 
P >’. 
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 If sets are states of affairs we can analyse set-membership in terms of (mereological and 
non-mereological) parthood: ‘x is a member of y’ is analysed as ‘y is mereologically 
composed of states of affairs non-mereologically composed of individuals and unit-making 
properties the individuals instantiate, and one of which has x as a non-mereological part’ 
[Armstrong 1997: 185-95; 2004: 112-24].  
If identifications were arbitrary, then these analyses would not work and ideological savings 
would not be made. If a world was any old object (e.g. my foot), or a proposition were some 
random set of worlds (e.g. < David Cameron is Prime Minister > = { x: x is a world at which 
salami is sentient} ), or sets were any old state of affairs (e.g. { Angela Merkel } is the state of 
affairs [[ the best selling single of all time is Bing Crosby’s White Christmas ]] ) etc. those analyses 
clearly would not work and will not earn any ideological coin. Similarly, Spudism will provide us 
with no ideological parsimony and so we might want to discard it for that reason. 
Yet this worry is misplaced. Even if Spudism offers no benefit with regards to ideological 
parsimony, the lack of a benefit is not the same as the presence of a cost. Whilst there may be 
other theories that provide ideological simplicity in a way that Spudism cannot, that’s not – by 
itself – a reason to think no-one could ever accept Spudism. To demonstrate this, compare 
Spudism to a realist theory of universals where instantiation is taken as a primitive (à la 
Armstrong [1989: 108]). The mere fact that such a theory does this does not mean it is inherently 
unacceptable – similarly, then, for Spudism which will also have to take instantiation to be a 
primitive. Whilst it fails to garner a benefit, that’s not the same as incurring a cost. 
One may complain that this is enough to rule out Spudism anyhow. One may concede that 
whilst we cannot rule out Spudism at the outset – that is, that we cannot simply not bother to 
consider it on the grounds of its obvious absurdity – it is enough that there is always going to be 
a more sensible theory that we should prefer on the basis of the cost/benefit analysis. So the 
mere fact that there are theories like class nominalism (which achieves both ontological simplicity 
in reducing properties to classes and ideological simplicity in analysing instantiation in terms of 
membership) means that Spudism is ruled out. To an extent, this objection is correct: there may 
well be theories that are just as parsimonious but that have additional theoretical benefits that 
make them superior to Spudism. But it doesn’t avoid the overall moral that we’re trying to chase. 
Spudism is just an example absurd theory and we can serve up another just as easily. Even if you 
prefer class nominalism to Spudism we can run similar absurd identifications elsewhere. Are 
works of music carrots? Are events identical to atoms of Betelgeuse? Is each material object a 
non-repeating rational number ending in 4? The only way for there not to be a theory with 
arbitrary identifications that was superior to whatever theory you currently believe would be if 
you start with an ontology with only one basal category (for given such an ontology it’s 
impossible – using reduction by identification – to achieve a more parsimonious rival theory). If 
you instead start with a theory with multiple basal categories, and don’t believe that one is 
reduced to another, a Spudist-style arbitrary reduction between entities from one category to 
another will be parsimoniously superior and, as you began thinking that one category was not 
reduced to the other, no complaint along these lines will be able to gain ground against that 
arbitrary identification. The idea that we are pressed towards a one-category ontology is one I will 
pick up again near the end of the chapter. 
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5. Arbitrariness Anxieties 
Spudism has been picked from off of a rack with an infinite number of equally dumb sounding 
identifications – I could’ve identified properties with thumbs, or with first kisses, or with the 
natural numbers (and so on). Each would be as effective at guaranteeing parsimony as Spudism 
so my chosen selection is arbitrary. Further, the specific identifications are arbitrary. For instance, 
crimson might be a potato from the 1800s rather than a King Edward in your pantry – it’s arbitrary 
to pick one rather than the other. With no motivation for one option than another – for one 
dumb identification rather than one amongst its equally dumb brethren – the whole affair seems 
outrageously capricious.  
You might demand a principle of identification in order to take any reduction by identification 
seriously. Principles of identification feature in other ontological reductions. Works of music 
aren’t identified with any old event, instead being the fusion of every performance (principle of 
identification: work of music m is identical to the fusion of all performances of m); 
supersubstantivalism doesn’t identify me with the region of spacetime occupied by the moon, 
instead identifying me with the region I exactly occupy (principle of identification: object o is 
identical to the region of spacetime exactly occupied by o); when propositions are reduced to 
worlds, < A > is reduced to the set of all A-worlds; Armstrong offers a principle of identification 
for which states of affairs are which class etc. (And, of course, in each case the principle of 
identification plays a role in achieving ideological parsimony as well.) Nothing of the sort is true 
when it comes to Spudism.  
Worries about arbitrary identifications have cropped up previously in metaphysics. Benacerraf 
[1965] and Armstrong [1986: 87] both worry about identifying numbers with sets as it’s arbitrary 
which identificatory strategy we settle upon e.g. we may accept that zero is the null set but do we 
accept von Neumann’s identification whereby every ordinal n = { m: 0 ≤ m < n } or Zermelo’s 
identification whereby every ordinal n = { n -1 } ? Moore [1999] advances the same worries 
against identifying propositions with anything other than a sui generis entity (see also Armour-
Garb and Woodbridge [2012], King [2013], and Jubien [2001]). But I don’t think such 
arbitrariness is a worry as every theory seems equally arbitrary when it comes to identifications. 
Shift to the oft-used metaphor of God creating the universe. Imagine God instructs his Property 
Angel to make some of the potatoes he created into properties, and also instructs the angel to 
make sure they have the correct features qua property e.g. that the potato they identify with blue is 
instantiated by all blue things (etc.).  
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The Property Angel looks askance at some (arbitrarily selected) potatoes and shrugs his 
shoulders. ‘Lord,’ he says, ‘This is crackers. I could make any given potato into a property, and 
make it the case that certain coloured objects instantiate it, but I could also make that same 
potato into a totally different property, such that certain other things instantiate it. Should this 
potato be red or blue? Should it be spin-up or spin-down?’ Such options are depicted in figure 1.1. 
‘Lord,’ he complains, ‘it’s against union rules to carry out tasks without clear instructions, so your 
reductive workforce is on strike until you resolve this.’ And so God cannot make the potatoes 
into properties without some regimented identification scheme. This last bit – that we cannot 
have arbitrary reductive identifications because of the Angelic Host’s collective bargaining power 
against the Almighty – is, of course, totally metaphorical. But it will be a nice placeholder for 
whatever reason it is that one might think that arbitrariness is a problem. It is irrelevant what the 
placeholder is a substitution for, since such arbitrariness is unavoidable even if you think that 
properties are not potatoes but are sui generis entities in a basal category of their own. Given they 
are sui generis, God makes some sui generis entities and, again, turns to his Property Angel, 
instructing him to make those sui generis entities into properties. But just because the things that 
the Property Angel is to turn into properties are sui generis does not solve the Property Angel’s 
qualms. The only difference is that – as they’re sui generis – they’re ‘featureless blips’, lacking in 
any interesting detail or feature that might help with the identification. So whilst potatoes don’t 
have any detail or feature that would guide the Property Angel in making a given potato one 
property rather than another, the featureless blips simply don’t have any details or features whatsoever. 
So, again, when the Property Angel has to turn the sui generis blips into properties, he’s faced with 
the same problem. Is a randomly selected featureless blip to be the property red? Or is it to be the 
property blue? There is nothing to tell between them! Indeed, the arbitrariness he faces appears to 
be exactly the same (just compare figures 1.1 and 1.2) for the only difference is that potatoes have 
additional intrinsic properties (having a certain mass, shape, or nutritional value) and those extra 
features are irrelevant when it came to ontological identifications – that fact was what caused the 
Property Angel a problem in the first place! If they’re irrelevant, the two situations are saliently 
similar and it is only as arbitrary for the Angel to identify potatoes with properties (and, thus, 
make it the case that Spudism is true) as it is to identify blips with properties (and, thus, make it 
the case that realism with no reduction is true).  
The complaint will be that the metaphor is misleading somehow. God, we might 
(metaphorically) think, can make sui generis properties ‘ready-made’, bringing into existence red or 
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blue with no need for any angel to do any work. God would, by divine fiat, bring the properties 
into existence, and that fiat would simultaneously fix, e.g., all the patterns of instantiation 
between the properties and their bearers. Now there’s no need to pay an uppity Property Angel 
who’ll only complain about the arbitrariness of the task. (This reply is exactly that which Moore 
[1999: 256] gives when defending his theory of sui generis propositions.)  But if God can do this, 
then why cannot God do the same for potatoes? Why can God not conjure up potatoes that 
come not only with a raft of potato-esque intrinsic features (being of a certain mass, shape, and 
nutritional value) but also with features a property should have (e.g. standing in certain 
instantiation relations etc.). It seems just the same, and if it’s just the same then the arbitrariness 
difficulty is just as problematic for the realist as it is for the Spudist (and if it’s a problem for both 
theories then when we come to the cost-benefit analysis, and compare only the two theories – 
which is what we’re imagining we’re doing! – then it’s a problem for neither theory).  
Exactly how this metaphorical story is to be parsed back into the literal language of metaphysics 
is a tricky question, but the idea is clear enough: should you think there is a reason that the sui 
generosity of properties means that they are not being arbitrarily identified with featureless blips, 
that reason will cut both ways and the Spudist can ask why that reason does not apply to their 
potatoes also being properties. 
One might think that this cuts against both Spudism and properties being sui generis. So will go 
the objection, we should instead endorse some other principled reduction such as class 
nominalism. That principled reduction is to be preferred to the arbitrary theories of both 
Spudism and properties being sui generis. But Spudism is only a stand-in absurd reduction. Just as 
with the objection discussed in §4, whilst resorting to class nominalism gets us out of this specific 
objection, it won’t generalise for all mooted reductions. The general moral is something like this: 
imagine you start by having n basal categories C1, C2… Cn. If we reduce one category, Cm, to 
another in an absurd fashion we then have n-1 basal categories and that resulting theory is more 
parsimonious than the theory with n. However, it’s true that it’s not as good as a theory according 
to which Cm is non-arbitrarily reduced to some other category. But we can just redux the absurd 
reductions! Now start with n-1 basal categories, and accept that Cm is non-arbitrarily reduced to 
some other category; nothing stops us selecting a totally new category and running an arbitrary 
reduction on that category instead. Spudism, for instance, might fall in the face of class 
nominalism, but we might then arbitrarily identify events with numbers, or material objects with 
propositions, or propositions with point sized regions etc. So we’ve still not escaped the general 
moral of the paper. 
Here things start to get interesting. The key issues are: if there are n basal categories (and n > 1) 
we can produce a theory involving absurd reductions that’s more parsimonious and has n-1 basal 
categories according to it. It will lose out to a theory which instead carries out a principled 
reductive enterprise, and leaves us with n-1 basal categories but in a less arbitrary manner. But 
this means that, one way or another, we can always reduce n categories to n-1 categories when n > 
1. If the reduction, at every stage, is principled, there’ll no longer be any room for absurd 
reductions but whatever route we take we end up with a one-category ontology. That sounds like an 
impressive result that I’ll take up discussion of in §7. Before that there’s one remaining obstacle 
to Spudism (and all arbitrary reductions) that requires discussion. 
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6. Cardinality Criticisms 
Perhaps properties are abundant. If they are there’d be more properties than potatoes and, as 
we’d then have to identify distinct properties with the same potato, we’d have a clear problem for 
Spudism. (Lewis raises exactly this objection against Shalkowski’s arbitrary identification of 
possible worlds with bottlecaps [Shalkowski 1994: 679].) Again: this objection is a problem for 
some absurd reductions but not all, so the overall lesson of this chapter is unaffected. If only the 
things we were arbitrarily identifying properties with were numerous enough, there’d be no 
problem. If properties appear to be infinitely numerous we just need to make arbitrary 
identifications with things that are likewise numerous such as classes or spacetime points etc.  
Indeed: take whatever category it is that you think has the highest cardinality (e.g. classes or 
abundant properties if you’re fond of such things; perhaps points if you’re more nominalistically 
minded). Of any other ontologically relevant categories there are we can make absurd 
identifications between entities from those categories and entities from the category with highest 
cardinality. The idea that everything is an arbitrarily selected abundant property (I’m charge, you’re 
being thought about on a Monday, Obama is being a dog or a cat etc.) or an arbitrarily selected class (I’m 
ø, you’re {ø,{{{{ ø}}}}}, Obama is the powerset of you etc.) is just as absurd as Spudism; such 
theories can be defended in just the way that we’ve defended Spudism; such theories are immune 
to the cardinality criticism; such theories are ontologically parsimonious one-category ontologies.  
So, as Spudism is just the stand-in for any arbitrary reduction we care to make, the cardinality 
criticism isn’t a problem. 
We should conclude that for any initial theory that has multiple basal categories a rival theory 
can be constructed which arbitrarily identifies entities from the categories without the highest 
cardinality with entities from the category with the highest (and arbitrarily select a category if 
multiple categories have the highest cardinality). That theory will be more parsimonious than the 
initial theory and, if we take seriously the lessons of §§3-5, won’t have any outweighing costs. 
And it will be a one-category ontology.  
Even if we add that there might be a better theory – one that has but one category but has every 
entity identified with members of that category using a principled reduction by identification that 
is non-arbitrary and/or yields ideological benefits – the upshot is nevertheless the same: we arrive 
at a single category ontology.5  
7. Conclusion 
I’ve introduced Spudism and argued that, if we take on board the tools already used by those 
who make use of reduction by identification, it is defensible. Further, what flaws befall it aren’t 
flaws that apply to every arbitrary reduction. Thus a one-category theory with arbitrary 
identifications will be superior to a multiple category theory (although not necessarily superior to 
                                                        
5 Note that even the theory that has arbitrary identifications will provide at least one benefit concerning 
ideological parsimony. As an example take an ontology with the basal categories CLASS, MATERIAL OBJECT, and 
PROPERTY. Previously you’d take, as primitive, ‘__ is a class’, ‘__ is a material object’, and ‘__ is a property’ to 
distinguish between entities of the different categories. Once we reduce everything to classes, though, we need no 
longer do that as ‘x is a class’ can be analysed as ‘x exists’ since everything is a class. One primitive can be peeled 
away from our ideology given the one-category ontology. 
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a one-category theory that uses principled, non-arbitrary, identifications). So, no matter what, if 
we buy into reduction by identification we should eventually end up with a one-category 
ontology. That is no small conclusion for whilst there are some who endorse exactly that sort of 
ontology (e.g. Paul [2012] thinks everything is a property, Armstrong thinks everything is a state 
of affair, and Pythagoreans think everything is a mathematical object6) a lot of ontologies don’t 
end up as single category ontologies – and certainly the idea that we must be driven towards such 
a thing is an unusual one.  
This upshot, though, is not the only interesting one, for the role of ontological parsimony in 
deciding which ontological theory to endorse is now severely diminished. If we accept that 
reduction by identification is an acceptable tool of metaphysics, then – when we concentrate only 
on trying to guarantee ontological parsimony – all we can draw from this is that we should 
endorse a one-category ontology with the category with the largest cardinality being that single 
basal category. Exactly which one-category ontology we should endorse is to be determined by 
some dimension other than ontological parsimony. Certainly the sorts of live debates one might 
have thought ontological parsimony was to play a role in will no longer take place. For example: 
imagine our initial ontology features SPATIOTEMPORAL REGIONS, CLASSES and POSSIBLE 
WORLDS. A Lewisian moots a rival ontology that reduces (by identification) the worlds to a type 
of region – namely a disconnected spatiotemporal region – in an effort to achieve qualitative 
ontological parsimony (even though, of course, it means introducing scads of other spacetimes at 
which every possibility plays out). [Lewis 1986a] (There are other reasons to endorse genuine 
modal realism, but let’s assume that our imaginary Lewisian is fixated only on ontological 
parsimony.) This is no longer any motivation to endorse that Lewisian ontology, for it is easy 
enough to conjure up a rival ontology according to which, e.g., every region and every world is an 
(arbitrarily selected) class. Along the dimension only of ontological parsimony, that latter rival 
ontology is superior (and avoids an infinite number of disconnected spacetimes at which every 
possibility plays out!). So there was never any reason for ontological parsimony to favour the 
Lewisian ontology. And this applies to any theory: as we can so easily lever in arbitrary 
identifications in order to achieve the maximal level of parsimony that one can achieve (via 
reduction by identification alone), we must accept that reduction by identification (at least in so 
far as it achieves ontological parsimony) is now a useless tool for deciding between live 
metaphysical theories. Similarly for all other example reductions from §1.2: as we can have 
arbitrary identifications, ontological parsimony no longer favours any other reduction of possible 
worlds; reducing organisations to sets or fusions; supersubstantivalism; reducing numbers to sets; 
reducing works of music to event fusions etc. In each case a rival theory can easily be produced, 
involving arbitrary identifications, that beats (or at least equals) its competitor. So past the fact 
that we should settle on a one-category ontology, ontological parsimony is now by the by when it 
comes to determining which theory is true.  
Before finishing, three points remain to be made. 
Point One: Ontological Parsimony by other means: I have argued only for dulling the edge of reduction 
by identification, not against ontological parsimony in general. For instance, if you achieve 
                                                        
6 Pythagoreans include Quine [1976, 1995] (the most prominent) as well as Berry [1955], Dipert [1997], Grandy 
[1969], Myhill [1955], and Tegmark [2008]. 
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parsimony by eliminating entire categories of entities (e.g. paraphrasing away commitment to 
properties (à la Jackson [1977], eliminating possible worlds by being a modalist [Forbes 1989], or 
– at its most extreme – eliminating everything [Hawthorne and Cortens 1995; Turner 2011])7 
then that’s still a viable tool for helping decide which theory is true. Similarly, one might take this 
to be a reason to try and achieve ontological parsimony using reduction by grounding, rather than 
reduction by identification (although see n3 for why I am suspicious of just such a manoeuvre).  
Point Two: Reduction by Identification still sees service: Reduction by identification is still a tool that 
might have a purpose – just not a purpose concerning ontological parsimony. For instance, it 
might be used to achieve ideological parsimony and eliminate: modal primitives by identifying 
worlds with disconnected spacetimes; constitution relations by making constitution identity; 
mathematical relations by analysing them as set theoretical relations holding between classes etc. 
That was the moral of §4.  
In light of this, we might recast every effort we previously thought as favouring a reductive 
theory on the grounds of ontological parsimony as being, instead, a case of it being favoured 
because of some alternative theoretical dimension (like ideological simplicity). We might even go 
as far as saying that ontological parsimony was mistakenly thought to be a virtue in the first place, 
instead being only the secondary side effect of achieving some other theoretical quality. These are 
all legitimate conclusions one might reach. Each variant ditches ontological parsimony, so 
endorses a conclusion stronger than that which I argue for in this chapter (namely that we should 
stop thinking reduction by identification helps decide matters ontological, with the possible 
exception of us being pushed towards a one-category ontology). As it endorses a stronger 
conclusion than the one I seek, I’ve no problem with anyone taking such an option. 
Point three: A reductio? Similarly we might take the above as a reductio either of any reduction by 
identification (say, because we suspect that the various strategies from §3 don’t work) or as a 
reductio of ontological parsimony being a virtue in the first place. Again, either option is stronger 
than my intended conclusion. Just as all roads lead to Rome, all avenues of defense lead – one 
way or another – to us coming to give up on caring about reduction by identification’s alleged 
ability to guarantee ontological parsimony. The only addendum is whether or not you think we 
should be pushed towards a one-category ontology: those who think reductions by identification  
are plausible and that ontological parsimony is a virtue should say ‘yes’; those who think that 
some part of that approach is flawed should say ‘no’. Either ways, most live debates in ontology 
should be blinded to any claims concerning ontological parsimony.8 
  
                                                        
7 Ontological nihilists would be the exception to the demand that parsimony favours a one-category ontology for, 
of course, they have zero. 
8 Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Chris Daly and Jonathan Tallant for reading and commenting on versions of 
this paper. Thanks to Helen Beebee, Ross Cameron, Philip Goff, Richard Sagar, Joakim Sandberg, Eric Steinhart, 
Jussi Suikannen, Kirk Surgener, Lee Walters, Heather Widdows, Robbie Williams, Richard Woodward and the 
University of Birmingham faculty. Thanks also to the attendees of the ‘Collectives in Space and Time’ conference 
at Universität Rostock (in particular, Ludger Jansen for his helpful comments) where another variant of this paper 
was presented. 
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